Two months ago, Ukraine launched an offensive into Russian territory that caught the world by surprise. Ukrainian forces made rapid advances over a few days and reportedly captured over 1,000 square kilometers of territory. Some western commentators hailed the incursion as a possible turning point in the war, while others questioned the value of the offensive. Ukraine itself pointed to the embarrassment that the capture of Russian territory would cause the Kremlin as well as the capture of Russian soldiers to be used in prisoner exchanges as indicators of success. Whether this offensive was a success or not will likely need the benefit of hindsight. In long wars such as this one, actions that appear to have been successful at the time sometimes turn out to be what sows the seeds of eventual defeat. Conversely, actions that appear to have failed or ill-advised can be the things that, with the benefit of hindsight regarding how the war eventually proceeded, turn out to be what caused ultimate victory. Whatever impact this offensive ultimately turns out to have, there are a few things that can be observed at this time.
1.) It isn’t entirely clear what the strategic objective of the offensive is/was.
While Ukraine is wise to only announce objectives that they have already achieved such as capturing internationally recognized Russian territory and Russian prisoners (both to be used in a future exchange), it is not clear that the offensive was worth it if this is all that it was intended to accomplish. The offensive was clearly not intended to conquer Russia or drive to Moscow as the resources put towards it were far too small to accomplish this, and Ukraine does not appear to possess the combat power necessary to reach Moscow in any case. An offensive that only had as its goal to embarrass the Russian government, capture some territory and some prisoners can be said to have had tactical goals, but not strategic ones.
However, two possible strategic objectives were theoretically within reach. The first would have been the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. Capturing this and holding it would have given Ukraine some real negotiating leverage as it would have made creating a nuclear “accident” on Russian soil a possibility. Whether Ukraine would want to do something like this is doubtful, and they can launch missiles at the plant anyway from Ukrainian territory if a nuclear accident was ever to be their goal. However, capture of the plant would give them some control over a part of the electrical grid for a certain part Russia, and this fact would have created a certain amount of leverage in future negotiations.
The second possibility would have been a hope that Putin would pull some units currently pressuring the Ukrainians in Donbass and bring them back into Kursk to expel the Ukrainians out of Russia. The hope would be that this would weaken the Russian push in the Donbass until the autumn rains come; something likely to slow offensive action even further and provide the Ukrainian units there with some relief.
Accomplishing one or both of these objectives would have brought strategic benefit to Ukraine.
Currently, capturing the nuclear power plant appears unlikely to ever happen. And while Russia has moved some units out of Donbass to help deal with the Kursk incursion and has possibly weakened its offensive operations in certain specific sectors, the net effect appears to have been marginal rather than significant at this time.
2.) Ukrainians have some capability to conduct surprise offensives/attacks.
While it might seem minor, the fact that Ukraine was able to conduct a surprise attack of this magnitude should not be simply dismissed. With modern electronic surveillance systems such as drones, satellites, etc., the battlefield is more transparent than ever before. The fact that Ukraine was able to mask several thousand troops (15K to 30k according to some Western estimates) with some equipment and launch a coordinated offensive at what was clearly a lightly defended part of Russia takes a certain amount of skill, organization, intelligence capabilities and tactical sophistication. While some might assert that the Ukrainian success in these matters is simply a case of more Russian ineptness in military operations, it is not clear that this is necessarily the case.
To be sure, the fact that this region was lightly defended was perhaps a political/strategic miscalculation in that Putin might not have thought that Ukraine would dare to actually invade internationally-recognized sovereign Russian territory. Although it seems unclear why he would have thought this as Ukraine has been striking targets in such areas for quite some time now. According to Ukraine, Russian forces in the Kursk area appear to have only numbered 11,000 at the start of the offensive in early August of 2024. If this was the case, then this really is an extremely small number and Ukraine rightly recognized a tactical/political opportunity. It also puts Ukraine’s advances once they invaded down to the strategic blindness of the Russian military command in leaving this area essentially unguarded, rather than battlefield ineptness of the Russian soldiers.
3.) While Russia appears to have increased its forces in Kursk, it is unclear if it is having an impact on other fronts.
Currently, Russia does seem to have been able to have moved a large number of troops (40,000 according to some Ukrainian estimates) into the area, and the Russia appears to have made some small gains in reversing the offensive in some area, although Ukraine still appears to be achieving small advances in other areas. However, it isn’t entirely clear at the moment where these Russian troops are coming from. As noted, some are being moved from positions inside Ukraine, but other units are clearly coming from Russia proper. The fact that some have come from Ukraine a certain level of logistical ability on the part of the Russian Army to pull units from Ukraine and move them north so quickly and get them into action. Other Russian units may be recently generated units that will now be sent to Kursk rather than Ukraine. At the very least, this fact would seem to be a net plus for Ukraine.
Summation:
In summary, the offensive is still ongoing and its overall impact on the overall strategic situation is still uncertain. One of the large hypothetical strategic prizes (the Kurk Nuclear Power Plant) appears to be out of reach. Based on what can be seen at this time, Russia is deploying forces to the region and Ukraine appears either unwilling or unable to deploy additional forces to try and reach it. Barring something unexpected such as Ukraine unleashing additional unseen forces or Russian troops in Kursk suddenly collapsing, the capture of this plant doesn’t seem like it will happen.
However, the diversion of forces from Ukraine either by having them pulled off the line and moved to Kursk or by having units intended for the Ukrainian front diverted to Kursk can be seen as a partial win for Ukraine. In addition, there were indications that Russia may have been planning to open another front against Ukraine from this region. If true, the Ukrainian invasion likely disrupted these plans at the very least, which would also be a win from Ukraine’s perspective. Finally, it appears that some bridges have been destroyed which may complicate Russian logistics, at least for awhile. Although these may be more tactical victories than strategic ones.
Whether this offensive turns out to have ultimately been worth it from Ukraine’s perspective will depend on how it ultimately plays out. Battles like this when described in history books appear cleaner and more organized than they really were. There tends to be some rough strategic and tactical guidance with a series of miscalculations on each side. The negative impact from the offensive on Russia’s strategic logistical system appears to be on the lighter side and is not likely to significantly hinder Russia from moving troops into Ukraine if it chooses to do so. Whether the Russian offensive operations in Donbass are strategically hindered is really the big question and will be the measure of whether this offensive action ultimately mattered. Currently, it does not appear to be so, but that could certainly change.
While there has been some criticism of the offensive in western publications, it may have been something Ukraine had little choice but to attempt. In hindsight, they probably should have put more troops into this offensive as it is unclear if they will be able to ultimately hold on to the territory captured. However, it may also be that this level of resource allocation was all that they could spare for this action. It was also becoming clear Ukraine needed to do something to improve morale. Although I think that political considerations and propaganda victories are being given too much value in the commentary (from both sides) that has surrounded this war over the last two years, one could make the case that Zelensky needed to show that Ukraine could still go on the offensive to keep people believing in final victory and stave off calls for a negotiated settlement. If this was the case and his reason for pursuing this course was political rather than military, then I think it was probably a poor decision. All Zelensky showed was that Ukraine is incapable of capturing a nuclear power plant that is less 100 miles from Ukraine’s border. And he likely used some of Ukraine’s most effective military units to illustrate this point.
The fact is that Ukraine by all appearance lacks the strength to recapture everything that Russia has taken (including Crimea) and reestablishing Ukraine’s 1991 borders without NATO entering the fight officially and with large numbers of ground troops. As the likelihood of this happening is very low, the offensive may end up being judged similarly to the failed German Ardennes Offensive of December 1944 which became known as the Battle Of The Bulge. In that case, a weaker side needed to try something to turn the trajectory of the war around, launched a surprise offensive at a weak point and toward a reasonable strategic objective (the logistical hub port of Antwerp) with insufficient forces, and the offensive ended up squandering precious reserves that could likely have been better used elsewhere (against the Russians in the east). While it is still too early to judge for sure, the Ukrainian August offensive is in some ways starting to look like 1944.
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